Local Evidence Inspector preview

Release identity and reproducible test evidence

Inspector v0.1.2 uses the vendored @secoya/pq-sdk 0.4.0-rc.6 verifier. Requires Node.js 24.7 or later for the supported preview experience, including native ML-DSA-65 verification. Package metadata still declares Node >=22; that lower declaration is not the supported hybrid-preview requirement.

Locally reproduced: 20 tests passed, 0 failed on Node.js 24.18.0. Coverage includes real Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 verification, invalid signatures, altered payloads, missing trust, strict parsing, replay and predecessor presentation, and input-race regressions.

Node.js 24.19.0 reproduction is reported in the supplied copy blueprint. Its execution log was not supplied for this review, so it is not represented here as a locally reproduced result.

The offline test disables fetch and checks local assets; it does not establish OS-level network isolation. Reports are printable HTML with browser Save as PDF. The Inspector does not issue records, authenticate imported identities, export an authenticated evidence package or integrate historical-continuity and external timestamp receipts.

npm.cmd test
npm.cmd start

Open http://127.0.0.1:4173 after starting the downloaded local application. Request the preview package or inspect a synthetic sample report.

Secoya One · technical reference · developer preview

One product. Separately versioned evidence format and implementations.

Secoya One is the product boundary. The Trust Record format remains the portable authority, while the TypeScript, Python and Rust implementations are versioned and tested separately.

Current identifiers

Product, format and implementations are distinct.

A verifier binds to the record format and applicable profile. Secoya One packages the operational boundary; no individual implementation becomes the protocol authority.

Product
Name
Secoya One
Company
Secoya Systems Ltd
Role
Evidence engine, verifier, integration interfaces and deployment packaging
Status
Developer preview
Protocol
Authority
Secoya Trust Record /3 RC1 · ratified
Record
secoya-trust-record/3
Canonical
RFC 8785
Policies
pq-only · hybrid-required · classical
Result
secoya-verification-result/1
Profile
secoya-verification-profile/1
Implementations
TypeScript
Reference implementation 0.4.0-rc.6
Python
Verifier 0.1.0rc2
Rust
Interoperability harness 0.1.0
Status
Developer preview
Distribution
Technical review material supplied directly
Standards and policy

NIST-standardised algorithms. Customer-selected policy. Deployment-specific assurance.

The record carries the selected policy explicitly. A customer chooses the production policy according to its regulatory, interoperability and assurance requirements; the pilot validates that choice in its environment.

PQ-only

ML-DSA-65 is standardised in NIST FIPS 204. This policy requires a trusted post-quantum signature.

Hybrid-required

ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 signatures must both verify. NIST guidance accommodates dual-signature operation when its applicable conditions are satisfied.

Classical-only

Ed25519/EdDSA is specified under NIST FIPS 186-5 and may support transitional interoperability where post-quantum processing is not yet available.

FIPS boundary

Secoya does not present its record format as FIPS certified. Any production FIPS-validation claim depends on the selected KMS or HSM, its validated cryptographic module, approved operating mode and deployment configuration.

Verification model

Use the published format. Verify with a compatible implementation.

Published formats and compatible implementations sit beneath the chosen sidecar, webhook/message-route or embedded integration pattern. A verifier uses the record and independently accepted trust material rather than relying on the originating system.

Published format

The record structure, protected fields, canonical bytes, algorithm identifiers and verification semantics form the compatibility authority.

Conformance material

Language-neutral schemas, committed vectors and expected results let another implementation test the same bytes and decisions.

Independent trust

Offline verification still requires the applicable published trust material, policy artifacts and a trust anchor independently accepted by the verifier.

Independent is not trustless

A verifier does not need an operational Secoya service or the originating application. It does still need authentic trust material and an independently accepted basis for trusting the authority.

Layered result

Cryptographic validity, authority at the relevant time, policy acceptance, continuity and replay, rollback or omission controls are separate evaluations. A single “verified” label must not imply that every layer was established.

Secoya One implementation layer

What the current implementation provides.

  • recordsCreation, signing, verification and linked renewal for versioned Trust Records.
  • signaturesML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 under customer-selected pq-only, hybrid-required or classical policy.
  • trust checksKey status, validity windows, revocation, authority and fingerprint evaluation.
  • envelopessecoya-hybrid-v1: X25519, ML-KEM-768, HKDF-SHA-384 and AES-256-GCM protected evidence.
  • schemasStrict Draft 2020-12 schemas, runtime validators and versioned verification results.
  • integrationSynchronous and asynchronous signing/verification with vendor-neutral registry, KMS, trusted-time and replay interfaces.
  • provider limitsAlgorithm support and provider-declared RAW-message limits are enforced before remote signing calls.
Not included

No vendor-specific KMS, durable replay database, managed registry, trusted-time provider or production monitoring service ships in this release.

Operational boundary

Secoya One uses one core across embedded, service and event-driven deployment profiles. Customer-specific connectors and controls remain deployment work. The implementation does not itself establish identity authority, production key custody, durable replay prevention, workflow enforcement or completeness.

Reproduced results

Implementation evidence, with boundaries stated.

TypeScript

100 passed · 0 failed

RC6 source suite reproduced on Node.js 24.18.0, 17 September 2026, including issuance, verification, encryption envelopes, async providers, schemas, canonicalisation, adversarial cases, property tests and 2,000 deterministic malformed inputs. The Inspector has a separate 20-test suite described above.

Python

25 tests · 538 subtests

A separate verifier reproduces verification, malformed-input, policy and trust expectations. It does not issue records or perform encrypted-envelope operations.

Shared /3 conformance

12/12 · three languages

TypeScript, Python and Rust reproduce the committed canonicalisation and Trust Record expectations through separate implementations.

Gate 6

17/17 · two internal implementations

The reference implementation and a separately authored internal clean-room verifier reproduce historical trust decisions through key, policy and trust-anchor change with Secoya and the originating application unavailable.

Assurance boundary

These are implementation, conformance and interoperability results. ML-DSA-65 and Ed25519 are NIST-standardised algorithms; that does not make the Secoya format or developer implementation FIPS validated. Production FIPS status depends on the selected validated module and operating configuration. No independent external cryptographic audit, production penetration test, legal-admissibility opinion or customer deployment assurance is claimed. The clean-room Gate 6 reproduction remains internal.

Runtime

Runtime requirements are explicit.

Technical review material and reproducible test instructions are supplied directly to qualified reviewers and design partners.

Complete encryption path

Node.js 24.7 or later is required for the complete native hybrid encryption path. The full suite has been reproduced on Node.js 24.18.0.

Node.js 22 behaviour

Non-native core paths remain testable; native encryption cases report an explicit version skip rather than a misleading cryptographic error.

Technical review material

Evidence available for diligence.

The frozen RC1 authority and its subordinate publication aids are available in the public specification repository. The frozen protocol is public. The Inspector and implementation material are supplied directly for agreed technical evaluation.

Developer preview and review material, not production assurance or certification. Production key custody, operational integration and customer acceptance remain engagement work. Reports do not replace the underlying evidence or establish the truth of its assertions.